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Trial Tactics Stephen A. Saltzburg
Reverse Rule 404(b) Evidence:
Part I
Defendants have the same right to offer Rule
404(b) evidence as prosecutors, and they are not
required to give pretrial notice under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. When defendants offer this evi-
dence, they attempt to prove that someone else is
guilty of the crime attributed to them. This often is
referred to as reverse Rule 404(b) evidence. Some
defense evidence will be admitted—indeed the
Confrontation Clause or Compulsory Process
Clause may require admission in some cases—but
not all defense evidence will be admitted. The
issue is where to draw the line between admissible
and inadmissible evidence. Two recent Rule 404(b)
cases help to provide an answer. In the first case,
the court held that the defendant had a constitu-
tional right to explore another person’s possible
guilt. In the second case, the court found that the
evidence was irrelevant and appropriately exclud-
ed. This column analyzes the first case. The next
column looks at the second.
United States v. Montelongo
In United States v. Montelongo, 420 F.3d 1169
(10th Cir. 2005), two defendants were convicted of
possessing with intent to distribute more than 50
kilograms of marijuana; one was convicted of con-
spiracy to possess the marijuana. They complained
on appeal that the trial judge erroneously excluded
reverse Rule 404(b) evidence.
Victor Montelongo, Jr., picked up the tractor por-
tion of a semitrailer truck from Gilbert Gomez, Jr.
Montelongo and codriver Carmen McCalvin were
scheduled to drive the loaded truck from New Mexico
to Michigan. On the day of the trip, McCalvin’s hus-
band, Ronald McCalvin, took his wife’s place because
he did not want her driving with another man.
The trip started with Montelongo as the driver.
After 30 minutes, Montelongo said he was tired
and McCalvin took over while Montelongo slept in
the sleeping compartment. When the truck arrived
at a border patrol checkpoint, McCalvin blew ciga-
rette smoke in the patrol officer’s face. Combined
with the strong scent of orange air freshener, the
officer concluded the two scents were attempts to
mask the smell of narcotics. The officer asked
McCalvin whether he had a codriver; McCalvin
said he did and nervously hit the curtain behind
which Montelongo was sleeping. Montelongo
stuck his head out, but kept the rest of his body
concealed. The officer requested and obtained per-
mission from McCalvin to do a canine search. The
dog alerted to the area underneath the mattress
where Montelongo was sleeping. McCalvin
responded, saying, “Oh my God. This isn’t happen-
ing to me.” Officers saw cellophane-wrapped bun-
dles when they looked in a hole under the mattress
and removed the mattress rack with a socket
wrench that was in the cab. They found 25 bundles
of marijuana contained in duffle bags, and arrested
Montelongo and McCalvin.
Reverse Rule 404(b) evidence
Montelongo and McCalvin defended themselves
using the theory that they did not know the mari-
juana was in the cab and that it belonged to
Gomez. The defendants were aware that earlier two
other truck drivers had been arrested under similar
circumstances. These drivers had picked up a truck
from Gomez in which police later found marijuana
hidden in the sleeping compartment of the cab.
These two drivers (Brown and Hernandez) did not
claim, however, that they were unaware of the mar-
ijuana. They claimed that they found the 34 pounds
of marijuana lying on the side of the road and hid
it themselves in the sleeping compartment.
Fearing they would be convicted of participating
in an extensive drug trafficking conspiracy,
Montelongo and McCalvin moved before trial to
exclude the evidence from the earlier incident. The
trial judge granted the motion. But, by the time of
trial, the defendants realized that they needed to
use the other incident to bolster their claim that
they had no knowledge of the marijuana and to
point the finger at Gomez as the mastermind
behind both incidents. Thus, after Gomez testified
for the government that there was no marijuana in
the cab when Montelongo picked it up, the defen-
dants sought to cross-examine Gomez about the
other incident in order to back their contention that
Gomez was operating a drug ring of which the
defendants were unaware.
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The trial judge excluded the evidence and rea-
soned as follows:
I am not going to allow any questioning of
Mr. Gomez relating to the prior incident. I
think that this matter is covered by [Fed. R.
Evid.] 404(b) and 608(b). And I don’t—each
of which, relate to specific instances of con-
duct on the part of the person being ques-
tioned. The 404(b) relates to other crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by the person
being questioned; 608 relates to the specific
instances of the conduct of a witness—spe-
cific instances of the conduct of the witness,
of Mr. Gomez, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting his credibility.
And what particular instances would we be
asking Mr. Gomez about? He wasn’t driving
the truck. He wasn’t charged relating to pos-
session in that instance. And what I’d be allow-
ing you to do is put before the jury just enough
to taint Mr. Gomez, when the law enforcement
authorities didn’t find any wrongdoing on his
part. Apparently, as I’ve reviewed the
Discovery that was provided by the
Government to the Defense, the truck was
returned to him and—without any prosecution.
(420 F.3d at 1174.)
Apparently, the trial judge concluded that the
defense could not question Gomez about the other
incident because he was not charged with or con-
victed of participation in that incident. Referring to
the evidence the defense sought to elicit as
“reverse 404(b) evidence,” the court of appeals
concluded that its admissibility depends on a
“straightforward balancing of the evidence’s proba-
tive value against considerations such as undue
waste of time and confusion of the issues.” (Id.,
quoted in United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380,
1404-05 (3d Cir. 1991).)
The court of appeals agreed with Montelongo
and McCalvin that the cross-examination of
Gomez about the other incident was an attempt to
elicit relevant evidence: “There are several similar-
ities between the two crimes, and a jury could dis-
believe the somewhat incredible story told by Mr.
Brown and Mr. Hernandez—that they found thirty-
four pounds of marijuana by the side of the road—
concluding instead that Mr. Gomez himself had
packed it in the semi-truck.” (420 F.3d at 1173.)
The court explained that it did not matter that the
drivers in the other incident did not tie the marijua-
na to Gomez: “Although Messrs. Brown and
Hernandez maintained that they simply found the
thirty-four pounds of marijuana by the side of the
road, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that
such similarities are not coincidental, which belies
Mr. Gomez’s claim that he had no knowledge of
the marijuana in this case.” (Id. at 1175.)
The court also found that the probative value of
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by
the risk of confusing the jury or wasting time:
“The Defendants only sought to cross-examine one
witness on this one discrete issue. Nor was there
any real danger that the similarities between the
two crimes would have ‘distracted the jurors’ atten-
tion from the real issues in the case.’ To the con-
trary, it would have highlighted the central issue at
trial—namely, which man was responsible for the
contraband.” (Id., quoted in United States v.
Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1406.)
Having ruled that the evidence was admissible
under Rule 404(b), the court found that Rule
608(b) was inapplicable. The defense did not
attempt to cross-examine Gomez in order to attack
his character for truthfulness, but attempted to
prove that Gomez was guilty of the crime charged.
Constitutional error
The court did not limit its holding to the Rules
of Evidence. It held that the trial judge’s refusal to
permit the cross-examination of Gomez violated
the defendants’ confrontation rights, notwithstand-
ing the discretion afforded trial judges to place rea-
sonable limits on cross-examination:
This error, we conclude, undermined the pro-
tections afforded by the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause. Of course, we certainly
recognize that “trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is con-
cerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interroga-
tion that is repetitive or only marginally rele-
vant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
679, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
Nonetheless, we underscore that a constitution-
al violation occurs when “the defendant is pro-
hibited from engaging in ‘otherwise appropri-
ate cross-examination’ ” that, as a result, pre-
cludes him from eliciting information from
which jurors could draw vital inferences in his
favor. Cf. United States v. Ellzey, 936 F.2d 492,
496 (10th Cir. 1991). Put another way, “a
defendant’s right to confrontation may be vio-
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lated if the trial court precludes an entire rele-
vant area of cross-examination.” Parker v.
Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quotations and alterations omitted).
We find this to be the case here. . . .
Prejudicial or harmless?
The government argued that any error was harm-
less. It contended that there was substantial evidence
of guilt. With respect to McCalvin, the government
relied upon his blowing cigarette smoke in the patrol
officer’s face and the strong smell of the air freshen-
er. It also relied upon his nervous behavior and his
outcry when the canine alerted to the marijuana.
With respect to Montelongo, the government
focused on his control over the truck, and his
request that McCalvin drive as they approached the
checkpoint. The government also relied upon his
delay in exiting the cab of the truck after McCalvin
consented to a canine search. With respect to both
men, the government relied on the presence of a
socket  wrench in the truck that perfectly fit the mat-
tress rack bolts. Most of this evidence was undisput-
ed. The government also relied upon one disputed
piece of evidence: whether Montelongo made a
statement in a detention center that McCalvin did
not know what was in the sleeping compartment.
The court of appeals was unpersuaded. In the
end, it reasoned that “the prior incident could be
viewed as compelling evidence that Mr. Gomez,
and only Mr. Gomez, hid and knew about the mar-
ijuana in the truck driven by Mr. Montelongo and
Mr. McCalvin.” (420 F.3d at 1176.) The court
noted that the jury acquitted Montelongo of con-
spiracy while convicting McCalvin, and concluded
that this was not a case of overwhelming evidence
of guilt.
Four possible theories
There were three plausible explanations for the
marijuana in the cab. First, it was possible that
Montelongo and McCalvin put it there, as the gov-
ernment charged. Second, it was possible that
Gomez hid it there without the knowledge of either
defendant. Third, it was possible that Gomez hid it
there and one or both defendants conspired with
Gomez. The government contended at trial that the
first explanation was correct and relied upon
Gomez to prove it. The defendants contended that
Gomez was solely responsible, and they were inno-
cent. It is understandable why the government
chose not to rely on the third theory. It would have
required the government to call Gomez a liar, and
he was a key witness without whom the govern-
ment might not be able to prove guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Thus, this was a case in which both
sides contended it was all or nothing—i.e., either
the defendants were lying or Gomez was lying.
The important factors
An examination of the court’s reasoning reveals
that four factors led the court to conclude that it
was not only error, but constitutional error, to pro-
hibit the cross-examination of Gomez. First, and of
great importance, “evidence of the prior incident
tended to negate the Defendants’ guilt, and, as
such, was directly—as opposed to merely “margin-
ally”—relevant.” (Id.) Second, and also of great
importance, the evidence tended to show the prior
incident involved “nearly identical conduct,” and
thus “was not merely coincidental,” and “could be
viewed as compelling evidence.” (Id.) Third, the
evidence “was neither cumulative nor repetitive.”
(Id.) Fourth, “the Defendants had no improper
motive in seeking it.” (Id.)
Conclusion
The case strongly suggests that reverse 404(b)
evidence is most likely to be admitted, and perhaps
even constitutionally required to be admitted, when
a defendant has a plausible alternative explanation
for criminal conduct and the evidence is essential
to develop that explanation. The case for admissi-
bility is strengthened with the defense theory is
clear and understandable, and the evidence plainly
fits the theory.
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